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FRAUD AND DEFALCATION BY A FIDUCIARY: THE
AMORPHOUS EXCEPTION TO BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE.
H.C. Jones III
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 523(a)(4) of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides
that an individual debtor may not receive a bankruptcy discharge for
any debt “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement, or larceny.”1 Over the several iterations of this
exception,2 courts have struggled to define the terms “defalcation”
and “fiduciary capacity,” creating much confusion.3 The current
exception provides that fiduciary capacity is a prerequisite to
defalcation for discharge purposes.4 However, without a finite
definition of the former, the latter remains pliable; it is impossible to
define defalcation without beginning with fiduciary capacity.5 Thus,
the faulty parameters prescribed to either over time have residually
affected the other.6
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
Id.; Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); Act of Mar. 2, 1867,
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440
(repealed 1843).
See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1758–59 (2013) (settling a
circuit split over the requisite state-of-mind for defalcation); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S.
704, 706 (1878) (discussing whether “fraud” carries a state-of-mind requirement);
Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 205 (1844) (holding that “fiduciary capacity” exists
only in the presence of an express trust relationship); Spinoso v. Heilman (In re
Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 152 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (“It is an understatement to say
that the courts are divided on the meaning of ‘fiduciary capacity’ for purposes of
nondischargeability of debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity . . . .”).
§ 523(a)(4).
“Defalcation is a vague, ill-defined term ripe for creative interpretation with almost no
currency outside the fiduciary context.” Zvi S. Rosen, Discharging Fiduciary Debts,
87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 51, 53 (2013) (quoting Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure
Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REV. 743, 756
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1758–59
(requiring recklessness for a finding of defalcation without addressing fiduciary
capacity).
“In veering from the original definition of a ‘fiduciary capacity,’ the lower courts have
then had to reconstruct the meaning of defalcation in order to avoid having this
exception swallow the rule of presuming dischargeability.” Rosen, supra note 5, at
87.
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Many federal courts have applied an improper standard and
permitted various states to deem fiduciary in nature many standard
commercial relationships.7 This has forced a choice upon subsequent
courts: allow the proper defalcation standard (strict liability) to touch
many commercial relationships that are not actually fiduciary; or
restrict defalcation by imputing to it a novel intent requirement,
thereby achieving an appropriate narrowness for the exception as a
whole.8
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the defalcation standard,
requiring that if a debtor’s conduct is not intentional, it must be
reckless.9 This is too narrow a requirement for defalcation. It is true
that exceptions to discharge effectively strip away from a debtor an
important mechanism, and should not be applied liberally.10 But this
does not outweigh the long-standing significance of fiduciary
capacity for the creditor, and the express intent of the debtor.11 It
would be absurd to favor all debtors over potentially innocent
creditors who relied specifically on the trust relationship charged to a
fiduciary.
In this Comment, I will argue for a return to the original
understanding of fiduciary capacity espoused in Chapman v. Forsyth:
only an express trust agreement can create a fiduciary relationship for
purposes of a bankruptcy discharge.12 I will argue further that fraud
and defalcation relate to distinct breakdowns of the fiduciary
relationship, and should not be interpreted as requiring similar intent.
Maintaining a rigid definition of fiduciary capacity will ensure the
relegation of fraud and defalcation to their proper spheres, while best
serving the “fresh start” policy and presumption of dischargeability
favored by bankruptcy law.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

See In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 156 & n.17 (listing cases in which courts deferred to
state law precedents to decide the ultimate issue of fiduciary capacity).
See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761 (“[I]t is difficult to find strong policy reasons favoring
a broader exception here . . . .”).
Id. at 1759–60 (“[W]here the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral
turpitude, or other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong. We
include as intentional . . . reckless conduct . . . .”).
See id. at 1760–61.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844).
Id.
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II. EARLY BANKRUPTCY LAW AND THE “FRESH START”
RATIONALE
A. The Fresh Start Policy and Exceptions to Discharge
Bankruptcy is written into the U.S. Constitution,13 but it originally
was unclear whether Congress had the power to prescribe procedures
for voluntary bankruptcy petitions.14 By modern standards, providing
a fresh start to debtors is one of the law’s principle purposes,15 and
courts tend to presume a discharge is permissible unless there is a
clear exception stating otherwise.16
Exceptions to discharge provide that particular debts will survive a
successful bankruptcy petition, such that the debtor is required to
repay the creditor despite having received a discharge of all other
debts.17 These exceptions have morphed over the years, but courts
continually cite precedent that reflects congressional intent from
antiquated versions.18 It is important to rein-in the current limits of
the exceptions to discharge, as their consequences are significant.19
A firm understanding of the evolution of these exceptions can assist
in interpreting them correctly.
B. Versions of the Exceptions to Discharge
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1841
The opening section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (1841 Act)
provided an avenue for debtors to voluntarily file for bankruptcy.20
This was significant because it represented Congress’s first attempt to
promulgate the “fresh start” policy to unfortunate debtors. While
Congress was given the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 4.
Rosen, supra note 5, at 57 n.29.
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 56–57
(“[O]ne of the central policies of our bankruptcy law is to give ‘the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”) (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013).
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (enumerating types of debts from which an
individual debtor may not be discharged).
See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 58 (1998) (explaining that a broad
construction would render certain exceptions “superfluous”).
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843).

136

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 45

the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” by the U.S.
Constitution, it did so only once prior to the 1841 Act.21 Even then,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (1800 Act) merely prescribed creditors’
rights for involuntary petitions against a debtor, now signaling that
the current debtor-favored reading of the defalcation exception is
quite disparate to Congress’s original intent.22
The 1841 Act holds nondischargeable any debt “created in
consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor,
administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other
fiduciary capacity.”23 These “exceptions to discharge”—analogous to
the current section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code24—are actually preconditions to any voluntary bankruptcy petition; they are not post
facto exceptions.25 That is, the exceptions intercede the permissions
granted by the passage, clearly indicating an intent to protect
creditors who have relied on debtors to the extent of a fiduciary
relationship: “All persons whatsoever, . . . owing debts, which shall
not have been created in consequence of [enumerated fiduciary
exceptions], . . . shall be deemed bankrupts . . . .”26 Were the
exceptions “tacked on” to the end, one might argue that they were an
after-thought—that the primary purpose simply was to establish a
“way out” for debtors. That is not the case here.
Further supporting this notion is the Supreme Court’s 1844 holding
in Chapman v. Forsyth, interpreting the 1841 Act.27 Today,
Chapman stands primarily for the proposition that fiduciary capacity
with regards to bankruptcy dischargeability should be limited to
express trust relationships, but the Court addressed another important
issue.28 Interpreting the statute (which had been repealed at that
point), the Court held, “[t]he debts here specified are excepted from
the operation of the act. This exception applies to the debts and not
to the person, if he owe other debts . . . . It was proper that Congress
should not relieve from debts which had been incurred by a violation
of good faith . . . .”29

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
Id. at 21.
5 Stat. at 441.
§ 523(a)(4).
5 Stat. at 441.
Id.
Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844).
Id.
Id. at 207.
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There is a clear emphasis placed on preventing discharges by
debtors who have breached a certain level of creditor-confidence.
This is true even of debtors who are entitled to a discharge of other
debts in the same bankruptcy proceedings.30
Perhaps most telling is the 1841 Act’s language itself. There is a
semi-colon separating the exception from discharge of a public
officer who commits defalcation and the exception from discharge of
any debt incurred through fiduciary capacity.31 Recognizing the
separation of these exceptions helps us to grasp the original meaning
and the true weight of the burden imputed to fiduciaries.32
The first section excepts from the operation of the law all
debts “created in consequence of a defalcation as a public
officer,” thus maintaining good faith to the government, or
as “executor, guardian” etc., thus maintaining good faith to
the estates entrusted to the petitioner, or “while acting in any
other fiduciary capacity,” thus maintaining good faith
generally to the trust reposed.33
“Contemporary courts did not [ignore the semi-colon]. They
understood this language as creating two distinct categories of debt—
those that arose from a public officer’s ‘defalcation,’ and those debts
that arose from a fiduciary capacity.”34
Because the Court in Chapman espoused the original standard for
determining fiduciary relationships, its discussion of other terms in
the now-defunct 1841 Act is particularly relevant. “The cases
enumerated [are] ‘the defalcation of a public officer,’ ‘executor,’
‘administrator,’ ‘guardian,’ or ‘trustee’ . . . .”35 In the Court’s view,
defalcation pertained only to the clause relating to public officers.36
The Court did not quote the Act as “the defalcation of a public
officer, executor, administrator”—as one would expect if defalcation
were to apply to each enumerated relationship—rather, it separated
the word defalcation from each of the others, applying it only to
public officers.37 Thus, the act of defalcation did not extend to the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 209.
5 Stat. at 441.
See id.
Rosen, supra note 5, at 59 n.51 (quoting Flagg v. Ely, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 206, 208
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846)).
Id. at 59.
Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208.
See id.
See id.
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other enumerated relationships.38
These other debts were
nondischargeable because of the level of confidence reposed in the
trustee by the beneficiary, not because of any particular action by the
trustee.39
That is not to say that courts should begin excepting from discharge
all fiduciary debts; it is merely to highlight the original gravity of
fiduciary capacity. The “defalcation exception” has a much different
form today than in 1841.40 Though the 1841 Act was repealed shortly
after being enacted, another Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1867,
carrying on the tradition of the exception.41 Congress amended the
language, adding further confusion to the meaning of the relevant
terms.42
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1867
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (1867 Act) provided that “no debt
created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his
defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary
character, shall be discharged under this act.”43 The shift from the
1841 Act to the 1867 Act did not represent a sizeable change to the
exception. The exceptions for defalcation as a public officer and for
any debt in a fiduciary capacity remained separate.44
In the 19th Century, defalcation was understood to include all
manner of failing to account for funds.45 In this way, it could be
argued that defalcation did not leave much to be added by the
following clause, “or while acting in any fiduciary character.”46
However, the separation of these two clauses most aptly points to
Congress’s recognition of the express intent accompanying a
fiduciary relationship. This was the second exception to discharge
drafted within 30 years that plainly deemed all fiduciary debts
nondischargeable.47

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id.
See id. (“The [enumerated relationships] are . . . cases of . . . special trusts . . . .”).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012), with Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440,
441 (repealed 1843).
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878).
See supra note 2.
14 Stat. at 533.
Id.
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
14 Stat. at 533.
Id.
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It is worth noting that Congress inserted “fraud or embezzlement”
into the enumerated exceptions in the 1867 Act, though clearly not
within the purview of the “fiduciary character” provision.48 This may
have been a precursor to the forcible insertion of the “actionexceptions” (fraud and defalcation) under the umbrella of fiduciary
capacity, brought to fruition by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.49
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act) was the point of no return.
The 1898 Act provided that “[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . were
created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.”50 This was
the first time specific actions had been included within the fiduciary
capacity exception,51 and the current Bankruptcy Code mirrors this
construction.52
Congress included several provisions now present in section 523 of
the U.S Bankruptcy Code, Exceptions to Discharge, having nothing
to do with fiduciary obligations.53 The inclusion of additional
exceptions forced courts to begin narrowing the various provisions’
meanings, so as not to except all debts from discharge.54 This
tightening resulted mostly from courts applying precedent concerning
repealed versions of the exception to current versions.55
Twenty years before the enactment of the 1898 Act, in Neal v.
Clark, the Supreme Court determined that fraud for dischargeability
purposes required “actual fraud.”56 The Court reasoned that “a
passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes
and follows it.”57 Because “fraud” was enumerated alongside
“embezzlement” at the time, fraud must have required intentional
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

Id.
See infra Part II.B.3.
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978).
See id.; 14 Stat. at 533; Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
See generally id. § 523 (excepting from discharge debts incurred by tax, non-fiduciary
frauds and false-pretenses, willful and malicious injury to a creditor’s property, etc.).
See supra Part II.A (explaining that bankruptcy laws and courts interpreting them
attempt to maintain the presumption of discharge, and support the “fresh start”
policy).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (“[F]raud referred to in that section means positive fraud, or
fraud in fact, . . . as does embezzlement.”).
Id. at 708.
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wrongdoing or moral turpitude, like embezzlement.58 Courts still cite
this analysis today.59
However, the Court in Neal was analyzing the 1867 Act, which
contained fraud and embezzlement as exceptions to discharge
irrespective of the relationship between the creditor and debtor—
there was no fiduciary requirement.60 Of course, the fiduciary
relationship was no less important in 1898 than it was in 1841; the
Supreme Court cited Chapman’s 1844 express trust language long
after the passage of the 1898 Act.61 Thus, fraud may have required
“moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing” after 1900, but not
because of the Court’s 1878 interpretation of a different version of
the Act.62 When Congress moved fraud to the fiduciary capacity
exception, a new analysis of its requirements was warranted, but not
undertaken; even the Supreme Court still refers to Neal.63
The 1898 exception represents an attempt to enumerate the various
ways a fiduciary debtor may incur a debt to a creditor, and to prevent
those debts from being discharged in most circumstances.64 The
reality of the exception probably was that “embezzlement” and
“misappropriation” were superfluous terms for fiduciary capacity,
which is why they were excluded from later versions of the
exception.65 Fraud and defalcation, however, are distinct actions by a
fiduciary, so they remain in the modern exception.66
4. The Bankruptcy Code
The 1898 Act was repealed in 1978 with the advent of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.67 While section 523 largely was based upon the
exceptions listed in the 1898 Act, it also expanded them.68 Section
523(a)(4), which is still in effect today, declared nondischargeable
any debt resulting from “fraud or defalcation while acting in a

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 709.
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).
Neal, 95 U.S. at 707; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (citing Chapman as fixing
the rigid structure of fiduciary capacity).
Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978).
“Embezzlement” and “misappropriation” are not within the fiduciary capacity
exception of the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
Id.
30 Stat. at 544.
§ 523(a)(4).
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fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”69
Clearly,
“embezzlement” and “larceny” are outside of the fiduciary capacity
exception, leaving “fraud” and “defalcation” as the only actions that
can except a fiduciary’s debt from discharge.70
Because fiduciary capacity is a prerequisite for the relevant fraud
and defalcation, the definitions of these terms are co-dependent.
Most directly, courts cannot ascribe “fraud” and “defalcation” their
proper definitions without harnessing the original spirit of “fiduciary
capacity,” as was established in Chapman v. Forsyth in 1844.71
III. FIDUCIARY CAPACITY
A. Chapman v. Forsyth
In Chapman v. Forsyth, the Court provided the groundwork for
understanding fiduciary capacity for purposes of a bankruptcy
discharge.72 The defendant (Forsyth) was a “factor,” working on
behalf of the plaintiff (Chapman).73 Factors were similar to modernday consignment shops, selling goods on behalf of others with the
express intention of returning the profits, less a commission.74
Chapman had engaged Forsyth to sell 150 bales of cotton, but was
never given the profits of the sale.75 After Forsyth declared
bankruptcy under the 1841 Act, Chapman challenged the discharge,
claiming that Forsyth had incurred his debt while acting in a fiduciary
capacity.76
The Court held that a factor was not a fiduciary for purposes of a
bankruptcy discharge:
If the [bankruptcy act] embrace such a debt, it will be
difficult to limit its application. It must include all debts
arising from agencies; and indeed all cases where the law
implies an obligation from the trust reposed in the debtor.
Such a construction would have left but few debts on which
the law could operate. In almost all the commercial
transactions of the country, confidence is reposed in the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844).
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 206.
Id.
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punctuality and integrity of the debtor, and a violation of
these is, in a commercial sense, a disregard of a trust. But
this is not the relation spoken of in the first section of the act
. . . . The cases enumerated . . . are not cases of implied but
special trusts, and the “other fiduciary capacity” mentioned
must mean the same class of trusts. The act speaks of
technical trusts, and not those which the law implies from
the contract.77
In 1934, the Court claimed that this standard “has been applied . . .
in varied situations with unbroken continuity” ever since.78
Additionally, courts of appeal often rely on Chapman, as quoted and
augmented by its progeny.79 Yet, many courts have strayed from
Chapman, allowing state law to determine the existence of a
fiduciary relationship irrespective of an express trust analysis.80
B. The (De-)Evolution of the Fiduciary Relationship
If fiduciary capacity is not narrowly drawn, courts run the risk of
“making the exception so broad that it reaches such ordinary
commercial relationships as creditor-debtor and principal-agent.”81
Many courts “have in effect ignored the Supreme Court’s teaching
regarding technical and express trusts . . . [and] simply look to state
law to see if some fiduciary obligation in a general sense has been
created.”82 “The problem with deferring to State law the decision of
what constitutes fiduciary capacity is that State law considers

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.
82.

Id. at 208.
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95
U.S. 704, 708 (1877)); Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S. 183, 184–86 (1907); Crawford v.
Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 193 (1904); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 375–376 (1891);
Noble v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 65, 68 (1889); Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 682
(1884).
Arvest Mortg. Co. v. Nail (In re Nail), 680 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing
Aetna, 293 U.S. at 333 (quoting Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208)); Follett Higher Educ.
Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Chapman, 43 U.S. at 207).
See Spinoso v. Heilman (In re Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 156 & n.17 (Bankr. D. Md.
1999) (listing cases in which the court deferred to state law precedents to decide the
ultimate issue of fiduciary capacity).
Id. at 159 (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Miles (In re Miles), 5 B.R. 458,
460 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980)).
Bamco 18 v. Reeves (In re Reeves), 124 B.R. 5, 10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (citing a
litany of cases in which the court permitted state law fiduciary classifications to carry
its decision).
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practically every agent to be a fiduciary within the scope of his or her
employment.”83
To effectuate the proper standard, courts must determine whether a
trustee willingly accepted the responsibilities associated with an
express trust: “The characteristics of an express trust include an
explicit declaration of the creation of a trust, a clearly defined trust
res, and an intent to create a trust relationship.”84 This has been
widely misapplied.
In In re Heilman, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Maryland cataloged instances where courts had strayed from the
appropriate standard: “Opinions are split as to attorneys, corporate
directors, officers and shareholders, general partners, limited
partners, and joint venturers, property managers, insurance agents,
lottery agents, and contractors, subcontractors and homebuilders.”85
In those cases, a significant number of courts allowed state law to
take precedence.86 The court explained that “while state law is
important in determining when a trust relationship exists, the issue of
whether the debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity is ultimately a
federal question.”87
There are examples in almost every circuit of bankruptcy courts
and appellate courts failing to adhere to this standard, creating an
amalgam of case law defining fiduciary capacity.88 The result is that
whether a fiduciary can receive a discharge depends largely on the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

In re Heilman, 24 B.R. at 157 & n.18 (cataloging cases).
In re Reeves, 124 B.R. at 9 (quoting R.I. Lottery Comm’n v. Cairone (In re Cairone),
12 B.R. 60, 62 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981)).
In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 152–55 & nn. 9–15 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases with
differing opinions on fiduciary capacity in each of the listed professions).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 158 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Stahl v. Lang (In re Lang), 108 B.R.
586, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)).
See id. at 156 n.17. The court listed cases from across the country where judges
merely applied a state law standard:
Schriebman v. Zanetti-Gierke (In re Zanetti-Gierke), 212 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1997) (a partner is not a fiduciary under Kansas and Missouri law for purposes of §
523(a)(4)); Smith v. Young (In re Young), 208 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997)
(fiduciary capacity is a question of Federal law, but State law is considered for
purpose of determining the existence of a trust); Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda (In re
Krishnamurthy), 209 B.R. 714 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (whether a relationship is a
fiduciary one within the meaning of § 523(a)(4) is a question of Federal law that can
be resolved by looking to State law; under California law, a partner is a fiduciary).
Id.
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jurisdiction hearing the bankruptcy petition.89 This is unacceptable,
as “it is important to have a uniform interpretation of federal law.”90
C. The Appropriate Standard
The original Chapman v. Forsyth standard is the appropriate one
for determining fiduciary capacity.91 “Express trusts are those which
are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some
writing, or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust.”92 There must be “the
separation of the legal and beneficial interests in a . . . ‘res,’ . . .
whereby the legal interests are held by . . . the trustee, for the benefit
of another, the beneficiary.93 It is only under these conditions, and
not when a trust arises after the fact, that a fiduciary relationship
exists.94
That is,
[i]t is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of
which the contested debt arose, the bankrupt has become
chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a
trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto . . . .
“The language would seem to apply only to a debt created
by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was
created.”95
The proper definition of fiduciary capacity has a heightened duty of
care for the beneficiary built in, and a party cannot become a trustee

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

95.

See supra note 88; see also Rosen, supra note 5, at 73–77.
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013).
See Rosen, supra note 5, at 52 (“[C]ourts should follow the approach of the Ninth,
Eighth and Fourth Circuits that looks to the origins of these terms, when . . . ‘fiduciary
capacity’ required the existence of an express or technical trust.”).
In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 161 (quoting Wertin v. Wertin, 13 N.W.2d 749, 751
(Minn. 1944)).
See id. (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 20 (1992)).
Id. at 161–62 (“Only the parties themselves can create a fiduciary relationship in fact.
A statute may recognize that relationship and impose additional burdens upon it,
including criminal liability for its abuse. A statute may even purport to convert a
breach of contract into a breach of a trust ex maleficio, but these are in the nature of
constructive or resulting trusts, arising by operation of law, and therefore
distinguishable from express or technical trusts for purposes of nondischargeability of
debt in bankruptcy.”).
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (quoting Upshur v. Bricoe,
138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891)).
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merely by way of breaching a pre-existing duty to a creditor.96 Such
debts would have not arisen from an express trust.97
It is with this proper understanding in mind that the offenses
specific to fiduciary capacity should be considered. A creditor must
show that “(1) an express trust existed, (2) the debt was caused by
fraud or defalcation, and (3) the debtor acted as a fiduciary at the time
the debt was created.”98 Adhering to this strict construction, there is
no need to restrict the defalcation exception, particularly considering
that fraud already carries a state-of-mind requirement.99
IV. FRAUD AND DEFALCATION
A. Precedent
1. Fraud
It has been settled since 1877 that fraud under the Bankruptcy laws
requires actual fraud, not constructive fraud.100 Nevertheless, it is
important to critique how the rationale for the current fraud standard
has survived so uniformly over the years; the standard from Neal has
been applied for 137 years despite multiple changes to the
exception.101
Actual fraud means “positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving
moral turpitude or intentional wrong.”102 The Court’s rationale for
this requirement was the placement of fraud alongside embezzlement
in the 1867 Act.103 Of course, the fraud included in the 1867 Act is
more analogous to the current section 523(a)(2)(A), not the fraud
within the defalcation exception.104 That is, in interpreting fraud to
mean actual fraud, the Court was construing a portion of the

96.
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 161–162.
See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844).
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Who Is Acting in “Fiduciary Capacity” Within Meaning
of Fraud or Defalcation Discharge Exception in Bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(4))—Fiduciary Capacity of Debtors Other Than Sales, Purchasing, or Leasing
Agent Debtors, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 33 (2015) (emphasis added).
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013).
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
See Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257, 264 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (stating that,
despite policy shifts in the current Bankruptcy Code, Neal has not been overruled and
“constitute[s] part of the background to the adoption” of aspects of the Code).
Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also supra Part II.B.3.
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provision not within the fiduciary capacity exception, but a standalone fraud provision.105
After the 1898 Act included fraud under the fiduciary capacity
exception, the logic supporting the imputation of a heightened stateof-mind merely remained unchallenged.106 The exhaustive list of
actions triggering an exception from discharge under fiduciary
capacity became fraud and defalcation, with fraud containing an
intent requirement from its prior interpretation.107
With this
construction, it was only a matter of time before the Court would use
some version of a noscitur a sociis (known from its associates)
analysis to conclude that defalcation also would require some form of
intent.108
2. Defalcation
The exact definition of defalcation is unclear, but the Supreme
Court addressed recently its state-of-mind requirement.109 Professor
Zvi Rosen provides a thorough explanation of the origins of the term
defalcation in his article, supra, arguing for a strict liability
requirement, as appears to have been the early understanding.110
In 1937, Judge Learned Hand wrote in Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. v. Herbst, while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, “[c]olloquially perhaps the word, ‘defalcation,’
ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in [the 1841 Act] it
may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all fiduciaries
who for any reason were short in their accounts.”111
There, the bankrupt (the defendant for purposes of the defalcation
suit) had been appointed receiver of a parcel of land as the result of a
foreclosure in the Supreme Court of New York.112 He received
monetary allowances totaling nearly $50,000, which he withdrew and
spent.113 The trouble was that the defendant did not wait for the
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978).
Id.
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).
Id. (“Thus, where the conduct does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or other
immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong.”) (emphasis added).
See Rosen, supra note 5, at 53 (“By the beginning of the 19th century, defalcation was
used more commonly to refer to an impermissible ‘holding back’ of funds. In this
context, it covered both an intentional failure to remit funds, . . . and a mere negligent
failure or inability to account for funds.”).
93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937).
Id.
Id.
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plaintiff’s appeal window to close, and did not consult with the
plaintiff regarding whether it planned to appeal.114 The plaintiff did
appeal, and the defendant was ordered to remit a portion of the funds,
but was unable to pay the balance.115
The Court of Appeals of New York decided that the defendant’s
surety was responsible to pay the remainder, so the surety filed suit
against the defendant in his voluntary bankruptcy petition, seeking to
have his debt to the surety excepted from discharge.116 The surety
alleged that the defendant had incurred the debt by “fraud,
embezzlement misappropriation [sic], or defalcation while acting as
an officer or in [a] fiduciary capacity.”117
The court assumed arguendo that the defendant’s conduct did not
constitute fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation, because it found
affirmatively that the conduct was, in fact, defalcation.118 En route to
this finding, Judge Hand explained that “[w]hatever was the original
meaning of ‘defalcation,’ it must here have covered other defaults
than deliberate malversations, else it added nothing to the words,
‘fraud or embezzlement.’”119
Despite acknowledging that defalcation must include
“malversations” with no heightened state of mind, Judge Hand
ultimately did provide a lengthy description of what knowledge could
be imputed to the defendant:
In the case at bar the bankrupt had not been entirely
innocent—not, for instance like the victim of an
employee—though possibly one may acquit him of
deliberate wrongdoing. A judge had awarded him the
money, and prima facie he was entitled to it; but he knew, or
if he did not know, he was charged with notice (having held
himself out as competent to be an officer of the court), that
the order would not protect him if it were reversed; and that
it might be reversed until the time to appeal had expired. He
made no effort to learn from the plaintiff whether it meant to
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 280 N.Y.S. 314, 315
(N.Y. App. Div. 1935).
116. Herbst, 93 F.2d at 511; see also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Surety
Corp., 10 N.W.2d 560, 560–61 (N.Y. 1937).
117. Herbst, 93 F.2d at 511.
118. Id.
119. Id. Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court, in Bullock cited the following dicta from Judge
Hand’s opinion, while leaving out the above text: defalcation “may have included
innocent defaults.” 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).
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appeal, and he did not wait until it could no longer do so; he
took his chances.120
It is worth noting here that the court appears to be “hedging its
bets” by analyzing the defendant’s state of mind.121 That is, Judge
Hand understood that a finding of defalcation was unimpeachable if
the state-of-mind were present; whereas a finding of defalcation for
an accidental default may have been criticized.122
This holding is mistaken as requiring a positive intent of
defalcation.123 This standard was applied simply because of the
confusing and redundant enumerated offenses, which, in any event,
are much different in the current version of the exception.124
For confirmation, one need look no further than the court’s
disclaimer at the end of the opinion: “All we decide is that when a
fiduciary takes money upon a conditional authority which may be
revoked and knows at the time that it may, he is guilty of a
‘defalcation’ though it may not be a ‘fraud,’ or an ‘embezzlement,’ or
perhaps not even a ‘misappropriation.’”125 Judge Hand’s opinion
ultimately would be used as support for a state-of-mind
requirement.126
B. Intent Requirement
Prior to the Supreme Court’s (faulty) settling in Bullock of the
debate over an intent requirement, the circuit courts were split into
three groups:
The First and Second Circuits require[d] “a showing of
conscious misbehavior or extreme recklessness—a showing
akin to the showing required for scienter in the securities
law context.” The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits require[d] a general “showing of recklessness by
the fiduciary” beyond mere negligence. By way of contrast,
the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits utilize[d] a standard
closer to the traditional meaning of defalcation—not
120. Herbst, 93 F.2d at 512.
121. See id.
122. “[D]efalcation may demand some portion of misconduct; we will assume arguendo
that it does.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
125. Herbst, 93 F.2d at 512.
126. Id.
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imposing any intent requirement, but rather focusing on the
“actus reus,” or the type of action or inaction that constitutes
a defalcation.127
The appropriate standard is that previously followed by the Fourth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. “[T]he ‘essence of defalcation in the
context of § 523(a)(4) is a failure to produce funds entrusted to a
fiduciary.’”128 Defalcation should be limited to a failure to account
for the trust res,129 and would therefore not require intent to achieve
the proper level of narrowness. “[F]or purposes of [§ 523(a)(4)], an
act need not ‘rise to the level of . . . embezzlement or even
misappropriation.’”130 “[N]egligence or even an innocent mistake
which results in misappropriation or failure to account is
sufficient.”131 This is not a harsh penalty; it is a recognition of the
responsibilities ascribed to a fiduciary if analyzed under the proper
construction.132
The new standard set by the Supreme Court in Bullock
undoubtedly will restrict the exception to a degree rendering it moot.
If applying the appropriate fiduciary capacity standard, as well as the
new defalcation standard, only near criminally-reckless activities will
suffice. There is a heightened duty of care already imputed to a
fiduciary.133 Requiring a heightened state of mind for defalcation
disregards the careful attention accorded to fiduciary duties.
V. BULLOCK V. BANKCHAMPAIGN
In Bullock, the Supreme Court held that, for defalcation, conduct
lacking bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral conduct, requires
an intentional wrong.134 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
127. Rosen, supra note 5, at 77–78 (footnotes omitted).
128. Id. at 78 (quoting Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
129. Id. at 82.
130. Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Pahlavi v. Ansari (In re Ansari), 113 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1997)).
131. Id.
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. See supra Part III.B. This would require that a debtor had entered into an express
trust relationship for the benefit of the creditor, knowing precisely the responsibilities
of the relationship, and then acted with the recklessness prescribed by the model penal
code in failing to remit the funds in his charge.
134. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013) (“[W]e include
reckless conduct of the kind set forth in the Model Penal Code. Where actual
knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if the
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on five considerations: (1) statutory context; (2) that the chosen
definition defines defalcation differently from its linguistic neighbors
in the statute; (3) concurrence with the principle that “exceptions to
discharge should be confined to those plainly expressed”; (4) that
some circuits have applied a similar interpretation without
administrative or practical difficulties; and (5) the importance of
uniform interpretation of federal law.135
(1) Statutory context. The Court determined that the statutory
context strongly favors an interpretation of defalcation that requires
an intentional wrong.136 In reaching this decision, the Court
referenced Justice Harlan’s opinion in Neal.137 Accordingly, it held
that defalcation should be interpreted keeping in mind that the
exception includes fraud, embezzlement, and larceny—a point the
Court considered strong support for reading into defalcation a stateof-mind requirement.138 However, Justice Harlan was interpreting a
version of the discharge provision that excluded fraud from the
fiduciary capacity exception.139 In fact, the version in question, the
1867 Act, required on its face that all fiduciary debts were
nondischargeable.140
Regardless, the Court relied on the interpretation of a different
fraud provision from the one situated beside the word it was
attempting to define (defalcation), and found support in that provision
for a heightened intent requirement.141 Ironically, had this case been
litigated in 1878, defining defalcation would have been a moot point
because all fiduciary debts were nondischargeable by the plain
language of the 1867 Act.142
Similarly, it is difficult to understand why the intent requirements
of “embezzlement” and “larceny” should play a role in the
construction of defalcation, when both terms clearly are situated
outside of the purview of the fiduciary capacity exception.143
Embezzlement and larceny are sufficient alone to except from

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

fiduciary ‘consciously disregards’ (or is willfully blind to) ‘a substantial and
unjustifiable risk’ that his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”).
Id. at 1759–61.
Id. at 1760.
Id.
Id.
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 706 (1877).
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878).
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759–60.
14 Stat. at 533.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
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discharge a debt; there is no express trust relationship required.144 It
follows then that whatever the state of mind required for those
actions—not presupposing a heightened duty of care—it should have
no bearing on the state of mind required for defalcation.
Nonetheless, this was the Supreme Court’s lead argument for a
heightened intent requirement for a finding of defalcation.145
(2) The definition of defalcation is contrastable with that of fraud,
embezzlement, and larceny.146 That is, defalcation with a heightened
intent requirement is not identical to the other enumerated actions,
and each of those actions are not merely “special cases of
defalcation.”147 This explanation offers nothing over a strict-liability
interpretation. Embezzlement and larceny do not require a fiduciary
relationship,148 and fraud still can overlap with defalcation within the
Court’s interpretation;149 it is a distinction without a difference.
Further, the Court acknowledges that “[t]he statutory provision
makes clear that . . . [embezzlement and larceny] apply outside of the
fiduciary context.”150 It is not clear the virtue of providing distinct
definitions between non-fiduciary action-exceptions (embezzlement
and larceny) and fiduciary action-exceptions (fraud and defalcation).
Presumably, the distinction arises out of favoring non-superfluous
statutes.151
This logic is not ubiquitous, however: section 523(a)(2)(A)
contains actual fraud as an enumerated exception,152 yet actual fraud
is exactly what is required by section 523(a)(4), per the Court’s
It appears that in certain instances, exceptions
analysis.153
specifically within the fiduciary context are sufficiently

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759–60.
Id. at 1760.
Id.
See § 523(a)(4).
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760 (“‘[D]efalcation,’ unlike ‘fraud,’ may be used to refer to
nonfraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty.”) (citing Defalcation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). This is true, but it does not change the fact that
defalcation may be used to refer to fraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty as well; there
still is no steadfast definition of the term. Using this construction, defalcation can
encompass fraud and the blank space left over.
Id.
See id. (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 698 (1995)).
§ 523(a)(2)(A).
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
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distinguishable, so as not to require the Court to “treat statutory terms
as surplusage.”154
(3) Exceptions to discharge ought to be confined to those plainly
expressed in the statute. The Court explains that this consideration
would benefit nonprofessional trustees,155 meaning that debtors
without a full understanding of the responsibilities inherent in the
relationship are spared from the perpetual insolvency that would
accompany a nondischargeable debt. Of course, applying the
appropriate fiduciary capacity standard would eliminate many of
these innocent nonprofessional debtors in the first place.156
Here, the Court has touched upon the very crux of the issue: the
new defalcation standard is a result of a pervasive misunderstanding
of the proper fiduciary capacity standard. If courts more consistently
applied the original standard—requiring an express trust—the harm
to nonprofessional trustees would be minimal, or at least limited to
those who knowingly accepted the responsibility.157 It would be
perverse to protect some small number of nonprofessional trustees
who ill-advisedly entered into a fiduciary relationship rather than
hold accountable potentially many more savvy, but negligent,
debtors.
(4) Some circuits have applied a similar interpretation without
statutory or administrative difficulties.158 There is no evidence to
doubt the veracity of this contention, but the point is invalid. There is
evidence supporting the efficacy of applying either of the other
standards previously used by the courts of appeal as well.159
(5) Interpreting federal statutes uniformly is important. The irony
of this contention is that the very reason for the narrowing of the
defalcation exception is the uneven application of the fiduciary
capacity standard.160 The Court reasoned that Congress intended for
each of the action-exceptions (embezzlement, larceny, fraud, and
defalcation) to be read in similar ways, but this disregards the
fiduciary relationship.161
It makes no sense to require a similar intent of the provisions
within the fiduciary capacity exception and those outside of it. The
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760 (quoting Babbit, 515 U.S. at 698).
Id. at 1761.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761.
Rosen, supra note 5, at 77–78.
See supra Part III.B.
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760.
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former can be committed only by a person who has willingly entered
into an express trust relationship; the latter can be committed by
anyone, regardless of their relationship to the creditor.162
VI. DELINEATING THE EXCEPTIONS
Fraud and defalcation, whatever their definitions, are at issue only
with regard to fiduciaries.163
In this context, fraud requires
intentional misrepresentation, and defalcation now requires
recklessness.164 Intentional misrepresentation is an appropriate
requirement for a finding of fraud, but not because of precedent from
1878.165
Rather, fraud ought to require an intentional
misrepresentation because the act itself may occur without any true
damage to the creditor. That is, a trustee may fraudulently incur a
debt to his beneficiary, not by any loss sustained by the beneficiary,
but because of an undue pecuniary gain to the trustee.166 To require
such a debt to survive a successful bankruptcy petition would be
extraordinary, considering that the creditor would have suffered no
actual loss. Thus, debts incurred by fraud should be excepted from
discharge only if the debtor had an intent to defraud the creditor.
On the other hand, a trustee who incurs a debt by defalcation
necessarily will have affected a loss to the beneficiary.167
Dictionaries have carried similar definitions of defalcation since
1867, and the crux is that the trustee defaulted on his debt to the
beneficiary, meaning the beneficiary incurred a real loss of the trust
res.168 Such a debt should not be discharged, as the entire point for

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
Id.
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760.
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759 (assuming that defalcation was broad enough to cover a
fiduciary’s failure to make a trust more than whole). If the Court assumes arguendo
that defalcation was this broad, the same must apply with equal force to fraud. In fact,
it is more likely that a debt by fraud would create a situation where the trustee is
required to remit funds to the beneficiary of greater than the original amount of the
trust.
167. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
168. See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[A] law dictionary in use in 1867 defines the word
‘defalcation’ as ‘the act of a defaulter,’ which, in turn, it defines broadly as one ‘who
is deficient in his accounts, or fails in making his accounts correct.’”) (citations
omitted); id. (providing a definition from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: “a non
fraudulent default.”) (citations omitted); see also supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
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the creditor of a fiduciary relationship is the faithful execution of the
trustee’s duties.169
A proper definition of “fiduciary capacity” requires that the trustee
knows the responsibilities of being a fiduciary at the outset of the
relationship, so there is no undue burden on fiduciary debtors.170 The
fraudulent acquisition of an undue benefit should require intentional
wrongdoing to be excepted from discharge; but withholding from the
beneficiary the very res that was the point of the transaction should
carry strict liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
A return to the original definition of fiduciary, as espoused in
Chapman v. Forsyth, can forestall any future expansion of the
exceptions to discharge by rendering unnecessary the constant
redefining of terms to prevent the steady undoing of its purpose.171
With proper definitions of fiduciary capacity, fraud, and
defalcation, and a proper understanding of why those terms are
placed alongside (though clearly separated from) embezzlement and
larceny, courts could begin to apply a uniform standard for
exceptions to discharge.

169. See supra Part III.B.
170. See supra Part III.B.
171. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

